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ABSTRACT
The essential elements of a negotiation are examined.
The formulation and solution of basic games are discussed*
The negotiation process is formulated as a game in order to
demonstrate the value of Game Theory in providing insight
into certain aspects of negotiation. The aspects specifically
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This paper is written from the point of view of the
Operations Analyst. In particular it attempts to apply the
Scientific Method to a subject which abounds in non-quantitative
aspects. The Operations Analyst does not provide quantitative
solutions to non-quantitative problems, He does y however
,
provide quantitative insight into such problems „ The insight
is not intended to be a solution. Instead it is offered
merely as one facet of the evidence which the competent executive
evaluates in the course of his decision process, On occasion




analysis will privide either affirmation of estimates obtained
by other means or contradictions which point to a review of
hypotheses.
This paper looks at the Negotiation Process from an
analytic point of view. It points out the parallel between
certain aspects of Negotiation and Game Theory s To this end
a brief discussion of the Negotiation Process is given followed
by a brief survey of the Theory of Games, Those aspects of the
Negotiation Process which have a particular analog in the
Theory of Games include selection of an initial position 9 co=>
operation, threats, and coalitions. Game Theory is shown to
be a convenient vehicle for viewing these problems in a quanti-
tative frame of reference. A technique is suggested for estimat=
_

ing the probabilities an opponent has associated with possible
courses of action.
2, Prerequisites of a Negotiation
There are certain prerequisites to any negotiation" parties
to the negotiation, an issue, and a willingness on the part of
the parties to negotiate.
A party to a negotiation is an individual representing
himself or some legitimate organization which has a measurable
interest in an issue,
A debatable issue must be at the heart of every negotiation <
It may be an object such as a manufactured product or art object,
An issue may also be a service such as that rendered by domestic
help. Finally, an issue may be a situation such as the Nuclear
Test Ban Treaty or a defensive alliance. An issue may be
simple or complex, but it must be clearly defined and thoroughly
understood by all parties to the negotiation.
Willingness to negotiate implies that no one should be
involuntarily compelled to negotiate. This restriction rules
out such practices as "Dictated Settlements" and so=called
"Unconditional Surrender Terms", While these practices exist s
they should not be dignified by alluding to them as genuine
negotiations. A proper negotiation allows each party the option
of declining to negotiate or of resigning from the negotiation
at any time. In addition, each party to a negotiation must have
at least two feasible alternatives from which to select his

preferred course of action.
3. Elements of a Negotiation
The elements of a negotiation can be conveniently categorized
as follows t
1. Research
2. Estimate of other parties' possible positions
3» Formulation of own possible positions
4. Estimate of possible outcomes
5* Selection of tentative initial strategy
6, Confrontation and settlement
As in most disciplines, research is an essential element.
The competent negotiator prepares well in advance for his con-
frontation with other interested parties. An historical Investi=
gation would certainly be undertaken in order to trace the issue
from its inception to its present status. Of prime importance
would be the discovery of any factors which affected the growth
or retardation of the issue. In some situations statistics is
a valuable tool for presenting large quantities of data in
convenient form. Overt and covert intelligence is a fruitful
source of information when due regard is given to its inherent
uncertainties. A psychological portrait of each other party
to the negotiation is of particular value to a negotiator
attempting to predict an opponent's response to a specific
proposal.

After a factual data base; has been established, the next
logical step is to formulate an estimate of the possible positions
of the other parties to the negotiation. This should be done
before one' 3 own positions are formulated^ for an effective
response must exist to every proposal set forth by the other
parties. The importance of this preparedness cannot be over-
looked. Considerable psychological advantage can accrue to the
negotiator who suddenly announces an extreme or unorthodox
proposal that leaves his opponent nonplussed and unable to
respond promptly and effectively. The estimates of the other
parties' possible positions are generally based on actions in
previous negotiations, their publicly stated positions (if &ny) 3
and partial knowledge of their objectives gleaned from intel-
ligence, observation, etc. The estimates should be complete
and include even extreme and apparently unreasonable positions.
The negotiator then proceeds to formulate his own possible
positions. In addition to his research and his opponents'
possible positions he usually has some sort of policy guidelines
established by his own superiors, or the organization he is
representing, or himself. This list, like the estimates above
fl
must include not only all reasonable positions but also a set
of unorthodox or extreme proposals specifically designed to
counter a sudden thrust by one's opponent. After completing
this list it must be carefully checked against the estimate of
the other parties' possible positions. There must be a respon-

sive counter proposal to each of their possible positions,
Estimating possible outcomes is probably the most difficult
preparatory task. Its importance, however^ certainly justifies
the expenditure of effort. There is no unique method of form-
ulating this estimate, and certainly no optimal method, One
technique of some merit is to number all the possible positions
of one's opponents in any arbitrary fashion- One's own positions
are similarly numbered , The respective number one positions are
then compared and the following question is asked;
If the opponents take position number one and I select my
position number one, what will the outcome be? Will they stand
tc gain or lose and by how much? Will I stand to gain or lose
and by how much?
Admittedly these are value judgements, and the classic objection
t© them is their subjectivity and uncertainty. However,, we do
make value judgements all the time, and the process is acknow-
ledged to be a necessity. Some work ias been done in the area
of filtering out the bias from value judgements and measuring
the uncertainties associated with them. Until the work in
this area has proceeded sufficiently s the uncertainty of value
judgements will remain a valid criticism of any work employing
them,, However it seems unnecessarjly conservative to suspend
any investigation into this area simply because the technique
of making value judgements is still uncertain
r

The opponents' first position is then compared with ail
the rest of the negotiator's positions, and a value judgement
is made of the mutual outcome for each pair. The process is
repeated with all the rest of the opponents' positions until a
complete array has been formed showing the estimated outcomes
for each possible pair of positions. This array can be con-
veniently displayed in a matrix whose elements are ordered
pairs of real numbers.
The problem of making value judgements^ particularly
with the use of a linear utility function 9 is discussed in
Appendix A,
The list of possible outcomes is then carefully arranged




or intransigence. Based on this ordering, a selection is then
made of a tentative initial position. A selection made in such
a manner might now reasonably be called a strategy. It is more
than a random selection and in some sense represents a function
of the expected gain. There are several options available
in the selection of an opening position. Broadly they might
be classified as a mild position, a moderate position^, or an
intransigent position. The mild position and intransigent
positions both have a cumbersome drawback in that they only
allow for subsequent adjustment in one direction . Prudence

would seem to dictate a position that allows for maximum free-
dom of movement in the initial stages of the negotiation.
The Theory of Utility, briefly mentioned above,, and more
fully discussed in Appendix A, is a meaningful technique for
estimating possible outcomes. The Theory of Games, on the
other hand, has its principal application in the area of select-
ing initial strategies and in the confrontation and settlement.
Such concepts as competition, threats, coalitions^, cooperation 5
the doublecross etc. can be meaningfully looked at with the use
of a Game-Theoretic Model,
4* Formulation and Solution of Basic Games .
The simplest form of a Game is the discrete two person
zero-sum game with a saddle point. Consider the following array
^
commonly called a matrix of payoffs. The elements of the matrix
represent the units of utility associated with each pair of
outcomes.
Yl Y2 Y3
xl 6 1 4
h 2 5
x3 4 -1
Let the rows represent the possible alternatives available
to Player X and the columns represent a set of similar alterna-
tives available to Player Y. In the zerc-sum game the elements

of the matrix represent the utility of the payment to Player X
by Player Y, Both players must announce their selections at
the same time, precluding any pax'ticular advantage accruing to
either player. Since an element of uncertainty exist s^, the
question naturally arises as to whether or not there is a way
of playing this game that is optimal, in some sense, regard-
less of how one's opponent plays. Let us look at this problem
from Player X's point of view.
Note that if X selects alternative 3 he stands to gain
4, 0, or -1 depending on Y's selection. Likewise if X selects
alternative 2 his gain can vary from to 5. However ^ alter~
native 1 is unique in that the minimum gain is 1 unit «f
utility regardless of Y's selection. Therefore by playing
alternative 1 each time X can guarantee himself a profit of
at least 1 unit of utility. In this sense alternative 1 is
optimal and the decision t© play it all the time can properly
be called a strategy. A similar examination of the outcomes
from Y's point of view reveals that Y can insure himself against
losing more than 1 unit of utility by always playing alternative
2. In the same sense, the decision by Y to always select alter-
native 2 in order to minimize his losses can properly be called
strategy. The payoff 1 is unique in that it is simultaneously
the minimum of its row and the maximum of its column. Such
an element is called a Saddle Point. A number that is simul-
taneously the minimum that X can expect to win and the maximum
8

that Y can expect to lose is called the Value of the game. In
games having a saddle point, the saddle point is always the
value of the game. Selection of alternatives which yield the
value of the game is called an optimal strategy- If the
selection is invariably restricted to a single alternative^
as in the game above, then the strategies are called pure
strategies.
Some games may have more than one saddle pointy as in the
following games
Yl Y2 Y3




Xo -5 1 6
Notice that elements (2,1) and (2,2) are both saddle points.
Naturally X selects alternative 2 every time and as such is
playing a pure strategy. Y, however , has a choice. Both 1
and 2 are equally good selections. Therefore Y may play 1
all the time or 2 all the time or any probability distribution
over the two alternatives. Such a mixture of alternatives is
called a Mixed Strategy. No mixed strategy is available to X
in this game. It can easily be demonstrated that the inter-
section of the rows and columns of any two saddle points
is itself a saddle point. The proof follows directly from

the definition of saddle point.
A more interesting game, and one more akin to a simple
negotiation, is the two person zero-sum game without a saddle




For simplicity each player is assumed to have but two alter-
natives. No loss of generality is incurred by such a limitation
and a great deal of clarity can be preserved. Clearly this game
does not have a saddle pointy therefore the value of the game,
if one exists, is not obvious and the formulation of a strategy
is not meaningful. Fortunately a value for this game does
exist. The proof of its existence here, and in every game of
this form, is contained in the Minimax Theorem first proposed
and proved by J. von Neumann and 0. Morgenstern in their famous
treatise, "The Theory of Games and Economic Behavior"
The proof is complex and the interested reader is referred to
the literature for a thorough treatment. The existence of a
value for this game leads one to believe that there must exist
some strategy that hopefully will yield the value of the game
regardless of the selection made by ©ne"s opponent. Therefore
if V is the value ©f the game, and if Xij X2 , Y-, , Y~ are the
10

relative frequencies with which the various selections are made,
then it must follow that;
X
x
(1) + X2 (3) = V if Y selects Yx
X
x
(2) + X2 (0) = V if Y selects Y2
X, + Xp = 1 by definition
This is a simple set of simultaneous equations which has a
unique solution using either Gauss' rule or Cramer's rule,
Larger matrices can be solved using Linear Programming Methods
which are amenable to computer techniques. An analysis of the
play of the game from Y's point of view yields a similar set
of equations. The solution of the simple game described is
clearly:
X-l = 3/4, X2 - 1/4 or X = (3/4, 1/4) }
Y-l = 1/2, Y2 = 1/2 or Y = (1/2, 1/2) ?
V = 3/2
,
Therefore if X plays his first alternative 3/4 of the time and
his second alternative 1/4 of the time he can expect to win 3/2
units of utility over the long run. Likewise if Y plays each
of his alternatives half of the time he can expect to lose 3/2
units of utility over the long run. The term expectation is
important in this form of game. Note that on no single play
of the game can X win precisely 3/2 units of utility. The
11

concept of a value for a game without a saddle point embraces
the notion of expected value, If the game is played an infinite
number of times X's average winnings wxll approach 3/2 as a
limit , assuming he plays the game according to the optimal
probability distribution over his set of alternatives * The
same expectation holds true for Y„ Note the distinctive dif-
ference between this game and the game with a saddle point.
In the game with a saddle point X is assured of winning pre-
cisely the value of the game on each play if he plays his
optimal strategy, In the game without a saddle point X is
only assured that his average winnings over a long period of
time will approach the value of the game. On any particular
play of the game X might win as much as 3 units of utility
or as little as zero, Therefore his strategy seems reasonable
over a long period of time.
But what meaning does it have if the game is to be played
but once? One possible way of utilizing such a strategy in a
one-play game is to creat some random number device to deter-
mine which alternative will be selected c This is well and
good if your opponent does the same thing. Will he? There
is no categorical answer except to assume that he will if he
is a rational person. Presumably he can perceive the difficulty
as clearly as you can and the presumption of rationality is
reasonable although not certain. This presumption of ration-
ality is crucial to Game Theory and is stated more precisely
12

below. It is mentioned here to show its applicability
.
In order to look at a non-trivial negotation from a game-
theoretic point of view we need a somwhat more sophisticated
form of a game than the one previously discussed. This is
the 2-person non-zero-sum game. If cliffera from Ihe zero-sum
game in that the elements of the payoff matrix are ordered
pairs of real numbers, the first number representing the pay-
off to the first player and the second number representing the
payoff to the second player. The second number is not neces-
sarily the negative of the first. If it is, we have the zero-
sum game as a special case.
The non-trivial negotation usually offers several alter-
natives which are mutually advantageous or mutually damaging,
although the advantage or damage need not be the same for each
negotiator.




Again each player is presumed for simplicity to have but two
alternatives. With the introduction of two payoffs in terms
of units of utility it is meaningful to point out that the two
players need not use the same utility scale. In the case of
13

a negotiation it is likely that protagonists will utilize dif-
ferent scales. It suffices that ratios of utilities be invari-
ant under a transformation. There are two approaches to solv-
ing a game of this sort.
Assumption A. When both players are using the same
utility scale.
Assumption B. When each player is using a different
utility scale.
Solution under Assumption A,
If both players are using the same utility scale it is
appealing to look at the matrix of relative advantages. Our






The non-zero-sum game has now been reduced to the more familiar
zero-sum game. Our example, in fact, has a saddle point. There*
fore, (1,0) is an optimal strategy for both players in the sense
that the relative difference of utility is minimized, Granted
that X is in a somewhat unfavorable position to begin with, the
selection of the above strategies at least minimizes the bad
situation,,
If no saddle point exists in the Matrix of Relative
14

Advantage then the optimial solution to the game is that prob-
ability distribution which yields the value of the ^ame to both
players.
Solution under Assumption B.
The solution under Assumption B is somewhat less appealing
due to the uncertainty about one's opponent's utility scale.
The units of utility that appear as the payoff to one's opponent
can be either revealed to you by your opponent with no reference
to his scale, or estimated by you with an associated probability
of exactness. In either case considerable uncertainty exists
concerning the implication of any one payoff. Only the assump-
tion of linearity of utility is sustaining in that it makes
ratios of utilities meaningful regardless of the scale employed.
Solutions under Assumption B require somewhat more detailed
treatment because of the uncertainties involved and because
opponents in actual negotiations find themselves confronted
with Assumption B far more often than Assumption A.
It is helpful to view a non-zero-sum game under this
assumption from a geometric point of view. Plotting X's
utilities on the abscissa and I's utilities on the ordinate^,













I A 3 H S L 7
Figure 1
Since the utility scales are related by some unknown linear
transformation, the scaling of the ordinate relative to the
abscissa is arbitrary. The smallest convex set covering the
pairs of payoffs represents the set of all possible outcomes
for any combination of probability distributions. Further 5
because of the unknown, or uncertain, relationship between
pairs of payoffs, a matrix of relative advantage is not mean-
ingful. One solution, proposed by Luce and Raiffar^l,
Braithwaite L 2j, Rapoport \j\ and many others, separates the
16

non-zero-sum game into two z;ro-sum games. In this approach
X looks at his matrix of possible payoffs and computes his











Employing the Minimax Criterion X discovers his optimal strategy
to be (1/4,3/4)* yielding an expected payoff of 13/4 units of
utility according to X's scale of reference. Likewise Y dis-
covers his optimal strategy to be (3/l9# 16/19)* yielding an
expected payoff of 108/19 units of utility according to Y's
scale of reference. These expected payoffs are shown as dot=
ted lines in our geometric representation,, In a game played
under this assumption the concept of a value to the game is
meaningful only when compared with some scale of reference.
Since there are two scales of reference employed there are
necessarily two values of the game.
5, Assumptions Required in order to Formulate a Negotiation
as a Game 9
In order to formulate a negotiation as a game the following
assumptions must be mades
l) The outcomes of a negotiation must be of such a nature
17

that they can be measured by a linear utility function, The
utility function need not be expressible in algebraic forrn^
but it must have certain linearity properties th it are more
fully discussed in Appendix A,
2) It must be assumed that the opponent will act ration-
ally, This assumption does not rule out a threat or an un-
orthodox move. It simply assumes that the opponent has an
overall objective and that he intends to maximize it in some
sense,
3) It is assumed that a negotiator can evaluate each
course of action selected by his opponent and match some
meaningful response to it.
6, Selection of an Initial Position.
As previously mentioned the negotiator has a continuum
of possibilities from which to select his opening position.
This continuum may be broadly reduced to three possibilities
,
a mild position, a moderate position, or an intransigent
position, A moderate position seems preferable initially for
the following reasons?
A. It represents the negotiator as a not unreasonable
person. Accordingly it imparts some assurance of ration^
ality and reliability,
B. It belies the assumption that the negotiator may be
gullible,
C. It permits maximum flexibility in that it allocs the
18

negotiator to subsequently soften or harden his position
without appearing particularly weak or overbearing.
D. It provides for a mini mumly acceptable payoff even
if one's opponent acts irrationally.
E. It allows one to resign from a possibly fruitless
negotiation without appearing to surrender.
Refer to the game discussed in the previous section under
Assumption B, Note how the Minimax Criterion develops a
strategy that yields a position satisfying the requirements
above. The Minimax Criterion minimizes both the uncertainties
concerning one's opponent's utility scale and his possible
irrationality. It provides flexibility in that one can mod-
erate or harden his position, and permit his opponent to do
so, while remaining within the convex set of possible out-
comes . It provides a hedge against a trap>, which imparts a
certain degree of comfort to the negotiator while he is in
the process of feeling out his opponent. Finally, the selec-
tion of an initial position by the Minimax Criterion commun-
icates a certain amount of information in a meaningful, albeit
indirect way, It tells your opponent something about yourself
and implicity invites him to respond. This tacit method of
suggesting some exchange of information opens the door to the
possibility of cooperation, The imputation of reasonableness




7. libcplorin/^ the; Possibility of Juopcration.
The Minimax criterion is admittedly unsatisfactory in
some respects, particularly when a game is to be played but
once. It yields an expected payoff which is independent of
one's opponent's course of action. Suppose, however, that
one's opponent's course of action is somehow predictable or
controlled. Then the possibility arises that both parties
to the negotiation might arrive at a satisfactory agreement
that provides for the enhancement of each participant's
expected gain. Game Theory imparts a certain amount of
quantitative insight into this problem,
Gondider the following game, which has numerous varia-
tions, commonly called the "Battle of the Sexes" . It might
equally well apply to two people simultaneously trying to
go through a single door or two trucks trying to cross a
one-lane bridge from opposite directions. As the "Battle of
the Sexes" the situation, briefly, is as follows
s
Both spouses, X and Y, want to go out on a particular
evening, X prefers to go to the boxing matches, Y prefers
to go to the ballet. Neither spouse despises the other's
choice but each prefers his own. Assume a certain amount
of communication has taken place so that each person is
well acquainted with his spouse's utility scale.





Alternative 1 is; Go to the boxing matches.
Alternative 2 iss Go to the ballet.
The solution of this game und^r Assumption A leads to a




(X-,, Yp) is a saddle point which implies that from a purely
competitive point of view each partner should act in total
disregard of his spouse. This is not particularly appealing,
and one might well suggest that both parties resign from the
negotiation and stay home.
Let us now view the game under Assumption B from a






Separating the matrix of payoffs and computing the minimax
strategy for each spouse shov/s that X can gain an expected
utility of 1/5 units by selecting the strategy (2/5 s 3/5)
and Y can gain the same expected payoff by selecting (3/5*
2/5). The selection of a mixed strategy at lea.jt offers
a more promising mutual advantage than the pure strategy
centered on the saddle point.
The situation, although improved, is still far from
satisfactory. If both players use their mixed strategies
to select their positions, the undesirable outcomes occur
13/25 of the time while the desirable outcomes occur only
12/25 of the time. Therefore if the game is to be played
but once, there is a discouragingly high probability that
a mutually undesirable outcome will occur,
Assume now that the partners agree to cooperate in
some way in order to enhance their prospects of a desirable
outcome. Game-Theoretically this is equivalent to trans-
lating the value of the game out along a 45 degree line
from the Minimax value to the limit of the convex set of
possible outcomes, (X,Y). If the partners can move the
value of the game to the limit of the set, (X,Y) 9 then
they could each realize an expected gain of 3/2 units of
utility. This is equivalent to both partners joining
forces and playing a reformulated game against nature. To
reach the maximum expected value the undesirable outcomes
22

must be precluded, therefore the reformulated game yielding the
maximum expected value is of the forms
1/2 1/2
(X,Y) (2,1) (1,2)
X and Y are now allied and play a game against nature. The
selection is made by some random device, perhaps the flip of
a coin. X's expectation is now 2 (l/2) plus 1 (l/2) = 3/2.
Y's expectation is now 1 (l/2) plus 2 (l/2) = 3/2. Selection
of some intermediate outcome between (l/5* 1/5) and (3/2, 3/2)
can be effected by both partners playing a joint game against
nature of the forms
(X,Y) (2,1) (1,2) (-1,-1) (-1,-1)
The partners agree on a mutually desirable outcome and assign
appropriate probabilities to the P's subject tos
tftXi - t Pf Yi




Cooperation naturally removes much of the competitive
aspect from negotiation. Each participant surrenders some of
his prerogatives by agreeing to pool his expected gain with
hi3 opponent. The circumstances surrounding the negotiation
23

might well preclude such an arrangement, but when an oppor-
tunity for cooperation exists, and repeated efforts at competi-
tive bargaining have produced unsatisfactory results, then a
cooperative solution seems to be an obvious exit from stale-
mate or resignation.
8. Threat CoCTaunication and Response .
A threat is a statement by a person to take some particular
course of action in order to restrict the opponent's possible
responses to a set which that person considers acceptable.
The effectiveness of a threat lies wholly in its credibility.
If your opponent misunderstands the threat, or doubts your
mettle, the gambit is futile and both participants face pos-=
sible ruin. The diplomatic attitude known as "Brinkmanship 11
is of this form. It announces an absolute requirement for a
certain arrangement and delineates the mutual ruin which will
ensure if the arrangement is not met. If your opponent finds
the threat incredible and declines to cooperate, you can
either crawl shamefully away from the brink or call down
mutual disaster by carrying out the threat. Clearly the threat
must be conmunicated effectively and used only sparingly.
From a game-theoretic point of view the threat is an
announced decision to select a fixed alternative regardless
of the consequences. Unlike the pure strategy which selects
a particular alternative because it guarantees some minimum
gain regardless of the opponent's choice, the threat is a
24

selection of a particular alternative with the objective of
constraining the opponent to respond in a predetermined mariner,




Under Assumption A a saddle point exists in the Matrix of
relative advantage at (X^, ^2^* However if -5 means a loss
of 5 million dollars the concept of relative advantages leaves
much to be desired.
Under Assumption B, X has an expectation of -10/11 employ-
ing the mixed strategy (2/ll, 9/ll), while Y has an expectation
of 1 employing the pure strategy (l, 0). Clearly, then, the
game is unfavorable to X„ Suppose, therefore that X peremptor-
ily announces that he is selecting alternative X-, and that no
possibility exists of his changing his mind. Y, of course,
could acquiesce and also select alternative 1. In fact Y will
probably acquiesce if
s
A. The threat is clear and credible.
B. X has so formulated the threat that Y's acceptance
will yield a payoff greater than the payoff he might
expect by dismissing the threat.
Notice also that the game formulated above has a safety
25

valve which provides a convenient escape in case the threat is
misunderstood or deemed incredible. ohould Y select Y2 then
X can retreat comfortably to Xpj, providing both participants
with an enhanced value.
Thus a threat is a worthwhile gambit only if it satisfies
conditions A and B and provides some sort of face-saving re-
course to both parties.
9. Coalitions.
In many negotiations the number of parties involved is
more than two. The natural formulation of this situation in
Game Theory would be an n-person non-zero-sum game. In addit-
ion to the difficulties inherent in solutions to any non-zero-
sum game, we introduce complications, as n gets large, that
may make the game unsolvable without making further assumptions
about the participants.
One such assumption that is generally made in n-person
game theory, if one desires a solution to the game, is that
some group of players will correlate their strategies if they
can improve their respective expected payoffs by so doing.
This procedure is the formation of a coalition. In the theory,
formation of coalitions is considered qualitatively outside the
formal game. Explicit rules covering possible and forbidden
coalitions are not available and have to be considered in the
context of the real situation which the game represents. If
all of the players are rational in the sense that they wish
26

to maximize their expected payoff, an additional assumption
may be warranted. This is that if a coalition has been formed,
the unaffiliated players will form a second coalition since
they can do no worse, and may do better, than if they play
individually against the strategy of the first coalition. This
assumption permits an n-person game to be reduced to a 2-per-
son game and facilitates the mathematical solution.
Unfortunately, the assumption does not appear to be
justified for some types of negotiations; for example, nego-
tiations between national governments. The difficulty \\rould
seem to be that it is probably impossible to obtain a payoff
function which represents the complex interrelationships
that exist between nations, especially when the number of
nations under consideration is large. An example where the
assumption may be justified is a Labor-Management collective
bargaining situation where national union formations have
been followed by industry-wide associations of management.
Here the relationship between the participants, say union
locals and individual companies, is repeated many times over
and thus has a natural coalition formation structure in an
n-person game.
Later we use the above assumption and consider negotia-
tions to be represented by a two-person non-zero-sum game,.
Any implications to be drawn from the results of this simp-
lifying assumption should be qualified by the considerations
outlined in the previous paragraph,
27

IAs an example of the formations of coalitions, consider the






(-V'. 2)(r< 2 ' 3)
Figure 3
Player I is guaranteed a minimum of =2 no matter which pure
strategy he chooses. Player II can guarantee himself a minimum
of -1 by playing pure strategy 1 and player III can guarantee
himself a minimum of 2 by playing pure strategy 2. These pay-
offs are the security levels for the respective players.
Now suppose the players use mixed strategies. Players I,
II, and III play pure strategy 1 with probabilities p, q and
r, respectively. Then the following hold:









^T8Vr +6p "2J +2pq ~p +3 >
where V^ is the expected payoff to the ith player.
28

Obviously, none of the players has much chance of influenc-
ing* °y himself, his expected payoff. For each player there are
too many terms in the expression for his expected payoff over
which he has no direct control. If we permit the players to
consult with each other prior to the play of the game and ar-
range to correlate strategies, that is, form a coalition, the
expected payoff may be considerably altered.
Suppose we are player I and wish to determine which of
players II and III, or both, we could make arrangements with
to improve our expected payoff. Consider first that we play
pure strategy 1, i.e., p = 1. Then
V-l = 3qr ~2 +2q ~2r j
= q[3r +2] -2 -2r j
= i{3q
-2j -2 +2q
If we choose to consult with player II, then QS qs 1. If
q = 1, then
which implies that Q £ V\ — 1, which is better than our secur-
ity level of -2„ Also for player II, V2 = 1 +2r and hence
1 « Vo •* ^ and player II also does better that his security
level of -1. This is then a good coalition from the point of
view of both player I and player II, but not necessarily the
best that either player can do. Consideration of all possible
coalitions of players and all possible strategies for such
coalitions leads to the conclusion that players I and II can
form a mutually most advantageous (in the sense that the max-
imum of their minimum guaranteed payoff is achieved) coalition
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and agree to each play pure strategy 2. Then for player I,
2 f ^ - 5, and for player II, V2 = 2.
From this relatively simple example it is clear that the
difficulties of analysis v/ould increase rapidly as n increases.
Additionally, we have chosen a game with only two possible pure
strategies for each player to illustrate coalition formation.
The problems associated with, say a ten-person game with each
player having 10 possible pure strategiss, would involve 10-*-^
possible outcomes with 637 possible coalitions!
Other considerations involved in coalition formation,
such as permitting transfer of utility between players in order
to form a coalition, are not treated here. The interested read-
er is referred to Luce and Raiffa, Games and Decisions » chapter
seven.
10 . A Tschnique for Estimating an Opponent's Strategy
Suppose we are preparing for forthcoming negotiations with
another party. We assume that we can identify all possible
strategies that either of us can play and we know our own util-
ities^ associated with the possible outcomes. Our previous
considerations have assumed that we also know our opponent's
utilities. We now wish to assume that we do not know our op-
ponent's utilities, but^can estimate them through knowledge
of his value system, intelligence information, etc. Using
these estimates we want to formulate the negotiations as a
two-person non-zero-sum game and calculate ar. estimated
strategy for the opponent, as the negotiations proceed we
will modify the estimated strategy in accordance with his
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observed pl:iy of the game. This procedure can be viewud as a
representation of the "feeling out" phase that usually occurs
in actual negotiations.




where we are player I and a,b,c,d are known and x,y,z,w are
unknown.
We assume that Player II will find some strategy that will
guarantee him some minimum expected payoff v. Suppose he plays
pure strategy 1 with probability p. Then
px + (l -p)y = v j
pz + (l -p)w = v





x -y +w -z x -y +w -z
A A A A
Now suppose that we have made estimates x, y, z, w on x,
y, z, w, respectively. Then our expectation of Player II'
s
strategy to guarantee some payoff will be
A A
a w -y
P ~ A A A A
x -y +w -z
If all of our estimates are changed by a constant c, that is,
A A
X]_ = x +c, etc., the calculated p-, is the same as p. This can













We must have some level of confidence associated with our-
estimates of x, y, z, w, or we cannot be sure that the game we
formulate even vaguely resembles the true situation from observ-
ing Player II 's plays of the game. Suppose we believe our esti-
mates to be correct within a certain percentage, say -100^,
0£/B £l/2. We can then construct intervals on the utility graph





We then choose the largest and smallest convex regions and
compute the estimated strategies associated with the utility
values defining the corners of the regions. We now have three






where p is the strategy computed from the estimates
p is the strategy computed from the largest convex region
p is the strategy computed from the smallest convex region
Now as we observe the pure strategies actually played by
Player II we will modify our estimate of Player II* s strategy by
using Bayes Theorem until Pr( p = d)ifc(, 0£ PC & 1, where ^ is
some level of confidence at which we will act as if Player II 's
true strategy is to take course of action 1 with probability d
and course of action 2 with probability 1 -d.
EXAMPLE 1













where x, y, z, w are unknown .
Player I reasons:
If I play (2/5, 3/5) I can guarantee myself an expected





I am fairly certain that these estimates are correct, at least
to 20 percent. If I can obtain a ,90 probability on any one
strategy of Player II, I will act as if he is actually playing
that strategy.






for which pr =
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Now suppose that on the firjt play of the game, Player II
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This process is continued until Prrp=.636l _ .9. It is pos-
sible that the number of plays of the game may be very large be-
fore this result is achieved, or that it may never be achieved.
In this case, a significant amount of data will have been obtain-
ed. A sensitivity analysis can be performed varying the esti-
mated utilities, the level of confidence associated with the esti-
mated utilities, and the degree of reliability required to act
as if Player II is playing a certain strategy.
EXAMPLE 2
There is a Company A engaged in manufacturing at one plant.
The labor force, consisting of 100 workers, is represented by
Local ;r718, Union B, The contract between the company and the
union is for a period of twelve months and is about to expire.
Both management and the union leadership are preparing their
positions for the forthcoming renegotiation of the contract.
The company has done very well financially during the period of
the last contract. Due to its small size Company A can compete
with larger companies engaged in the same enterprise principal-
ly because of its good reputation for delivering orders on time.
At present the company has a backload of orders sufficient to
keep the xvork force busy for a full twelve month period. The
wage rate at Company A is higher than other locally prevailing
wages, but is lower than the industry standard wage. Conse-
quently, management believes that the principal union demand
during negotiation will be an increased hourly wage. In antici-
pation of this demand, management has calculated that a maximum
increase of 9 cents per hour can be granted.
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Union B is an established representative of the work force
at Company h, having been recognized as the bargaining agent some
eight years ago. The union leaders are satisfied with the fringe
benefits currently in effect at the company and intend to make
an increased hourly wage rate their sole demand in the negotia-
tions. An increase of 16 cents per hour has been set as a goal
to be achieved. This would bring the vvage rate at Company A
into line with the industry standard. If this demand is not met
the union is prepared to call a strike. National headquarters
of Union D will provide strike funds for a period of six months
if a strike takes place.
Payoffs
Under the present wage rate of $2.00 per hour Company A
makes a profit of $10,000 per unit sold. One unit per month
is the capacity of the plant. If the union members should go
on strike the plant will be closed down for one month before
it can commence operating again. We make the following def-
initions t
y = wage increase granted to employees (Dollars per month)
T.. = number of months employees work
Tp = number of months employees strike
where * Tx £ 12, £ T2 6 12, Tx +T2 = 12
R = rate of production (units per month)
g = profit from sale of one unit under present wage rate
(dollars )
Then the profit to Company A for the year following the expira-












x -T2 ) -yTx
= (20000 -y) T
x
-120000 j
If the union goes on strike, the national headquarters will
provide $16000 per month in strike fund wages to the work force
at Company A. This income for the workers will cease if a strike
lasts more than six months. At the present wage rates the work-
ers, working 160 hours a month, have a total payroll of $32000.
The total income to the members of the union over the next
year will be
yT -(32000 -16000)T £ T £ 6





y^ -32000T2 -96000 6 £ T2 i 12
12y -T2 (y -16000) 0*T2 i 6
12y +96000 -T2 (y -32000) 6 £ T2 i 12
Thus far the payoffs for the union and the company have
been given such that a deterministic point can be computed where
both parties can make no gain during the remainder of t he con-
tract period. This point is reached when T2 = 3.33. A strike
past that length of time would involve net losses to both par-
ties. However, both management and the union will have to con-
sider other, more subjective, aspects of their payoffs. For
instance, management might consider that if they fail to de-
38

liver an order due to a strike the buyer may remove his business
to another company permanently. This may cause the loss of future
orders. The union should consider the effect of a possible "lost"
strike and consequent loss of confidence in the leadersldp on
the part of the members.
Let us assume that management considers an unfilled order
as a cost which is equal to twice the profit they would have
made on the order. The apparent second loss of profit is to
account for possible lost future orders. This factor in man-
agement's utility function is unknown to the union. Then the
management utility function is
UA = (30000 -y) Tx -240000
Further, let us assume that the union members will initially
be receptive to a strike in the expectation of future benefits
to be derived, but after a strike of two months duration they
would prefer to be receiving their wages at work. This factor
will be unknown to management. The union leaders consider that
this can be crudely represented by including the expression
10000 -5000T2 in their utility function. Then
10000 +12y -T2 (y +11000 ) 0iT2 £ 6
12y +106000 -T2 (y +27000) 6 £ T2 t 12 ,
Now suppose that the actual negotiations have started.
The union's initial demand is for an 18-3/4 cents per hour in-
crease and management responds with an offer of 6-3/4 cents
per hour. If we let pure strategy 1 for each party be agreement
on the union demand and pure strategy 2 be agreement on the












(84,000, 36OOO) (-27000, -12000)
(-27000, -12000) (108000, 22000)
Payoffs in positions 1,2 and 2,1 are the amounts each party will
lose if T2 = 1, i.e.. they do not agree and there is a strike
for one month. The figues are computed assuming each had accept-
ed the other's initial position.
Now each of the parties can proceed to use example 1 to
attempt to determine the other's strategy, with the exception
that here the utility functions are not constants. Therefore,
the game must be reformulated at intervals of one month.
EXAMPLE 3
Consider example 2, except that we now wish to examine the
case where two issues, rather than one, are to be negotiated.
Assume that the Union, in addition to the wage increase demand-
ed, has asked for some fringe benefit, such as an unemployment
compensation plan.
Suppose the management of Company A has computed that they
can afford to grant 5 cents per hour per employee in fringe
benefits if the wage increase is held to 9 cents per hour. The
union intends to ask for an unemployment compensation plan the
cost of which will be 7 cents per hour per employee to the
company. Such a plan would provide about 5% of the work force
at Company A half pay for each month of unemployment.
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At the opening session of the negotiations, the Union de-
mand for fringe benefits is made for the unemployment compensa-
tion plan costing the company 7 cents per hour or $1120 per
month. Management responds with the offer of a similar plan
costing only $ cents per hour or $800 per month.
We can now formulate the negotiations as a game in two
different ways, that is, either as two games involving two sepa-
rate issues, or simply add the demands and offers and consider
the resultant demand and offer as a single game. If we pursue
the latter course we obscure the differentiation of the two
issues and, in effect, simply reconsider example 2. We have
simply added explanation of the issue involved. Therefore,
we wish to formulate the negotiations in the first sense,




(84000, 36000) (-27000, -10000)
(-27000, -10000) (108000, 12000)
2. Compensation Plan
II
(-13440, 13440) (0, 0)
(0, 0) (-9600, 9600)
where player I is Management, Player II is the Union, strategy




While there are now two game matrices under consideration it
should be kept in mind that they are interdependent, that is,
agreement on both issues involved is necessary to a successful
conclusion of the negotiations.
The interesting feature of this formulation of the
negotiations is the ability of the two parties to transfer
utilities from one matrix to the other by making proposals which
are trade-offs, For instance, the Union could make the following
offer I
If you (management) will agree to a wage increase
of 15 cents per hour along with the compensation plan
costing 7 cents an hour, I believe we can reach an
agreement.
(Such proposals would reflect the union interest in the issues
involved. Here the union believes the acceptance of the com-
pensation plan is more important to the members of t he union
than the higher wage increase originally demanded.)
Management might respond with an offer to agree to the com-
pensation plan propsed by the union if the wage increase is held
to 7 cents an hour. This would still keep management's cost
within their goal of no more than 14 cents per hour total cost.
After the proposals have been made, the two game matrices





(91200, 28800) (-28800, =12200)





(-13440, 13440) (0, 0)
(0, 0) (-13440, 13440)
Here the interdependency of the two game matrices is made
even clearer. Apparently, from inspection of the second game
matrix, management has agreed to the union compensation plan.
This is not the case, however, since the acceptance of the
union compensation plan is made contingent upon union accept-
ance of a certain wage increase as indicated by the first game
matrix.
In this example, Management can be concerned solely with
the total cost accrued in order to reach a settlement. This is
the case because we have chosen the example such that the util=
ities are directly transferable between the two game matrices.
If the second issue raised by the union had been that the union
be permitted a voice in affairs within the company, which manage-
ment considered to be their prerogative^ such direct transfer
of utility would not be permissible.
11. Conclusion .
Hopefully the reader will carry away two impressions^, one
general and one specific. The general impression to be conveyed
is that the Scientific Method, as practiced by the Operations
Analyst, can be fruitfully employed to provide quantitative
approximations to certain aspects of non-quantitative problems.
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The particular impression to be conveyed is that Game Theory
can be a useful technique for providing quantitative insight
into certain aspects of the negotiation Process. The Game-
Theoretic conclusions do not purport to be a solution, but
they do provide a measure for comparing alternatives. Too
often, the authors believe, methodology such as Game Theory,
having originally promised much and delivered little in the
way of specific solutions, has been dismissed as irrelevant.
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Some Properties of Linear Utility Functions
The game theoretic approach to bargaining requires some
payoff function which will represent the possible outcomes of
the game. The definition and mathematical properties of the
payoff function are the subject of Utility Theory ,*"
In this thesis, we consider only games which have a finite,
discrete number of outcomes. Consequently we need only have a
finite discrete payoff function and do not consider other funct-
ional forms.
Suppose a player, in the game theory sense, with several
possible outcomes of the game, say, A,B,C,D, desires to estab-
lish relationships among the four outcomes which will assist
him in selecting a course of action for the play of the game.
For simplicity let us assume that the payoff function assign?
real numbers a,b,c,d to the outcomes A,B,C,D, respectively.
To obtain the linear utility function we make the following as-
sumptions about the alternatives A,B,C,Ds
1. The player considering any two of the outcomes can
decide which is preferable or that they are equally desir=
able.
2. The preferences for outcomes can be orderedj further^,
the ordering is transitive.
"^Utility Theory is not necessarily connected with Game Theory
and can be useful in other contexts, but here we are only con=
cerned with its implications for Game Theory,

3. Any probability combination of equally desirable out-
comes is just as desirable as either outcome.
4. If outcome A is preferred to B and B is preferred to
C f thon there is a probability combination of A and C which
is just as desirable as B.
5. If p is a probability j Ofp£l £ and outcomes A and B are
equally desirable,, then pA +(l-p)C and pB +(l-p)C are
equally desirable,
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